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Abstract 
 
Introduction. This study explores the notions of government openness and secrecy in public access to 
government documents under the Freedom of Information Act, particularly policy-related documents, 
to provide an overview of FOI trends and the tensions of FOI conditional exemptions as they relate to 
government decision-making processes and the public interest. 
Method. Based on two cases studies there are several data sources: open government datasets, 
government annual reports, government agencies’ FOI disclosure logs, and two FOI requests and 
associated correspondence.. 
Analysis. Frequency distributions were produced from the datasets to establish trends in information 
requests and to consider the impact of government policies on the outcomes. A qualitative analysis was 
done on the documents of the two cases studies to explore the decision-making processes. 
Results. Government policies do impact on FOI effectiveness. Conditional exemptions are used to deny 
requests, rather than to facilitate disclosure. Conflict may arise between privacy issues and disclosure 
on a policy matter. 
Conclusions. The arbitrariness of information practices in the implementation of the FOI regime in 
Australia means that a balance has not been achieved between openness of government and secrecy. 
 
Introduction 
Government accountability and the enabling of participative democracy through openness and 
transparency are claimed as the orthodoxy of the twenty-first century, built upon the twentieth 
century’s right to know and open government movements. They facilitate an open society in which 
there is a free flow of information enabling citizens to “evaluate critically the consequences of the 
implementation of government policies, which can then be abandoned or modified in the light of such 
critical scrutiny” (Thornton, 2016, Section 6). 
Few would disagree with the principle of openness of government; the ruled and the rulers recognise 
that the public record, government information, is the evidence of governance and democratic 
processes. But the public record is not automatically made public; citizens and governments 
throughout the world have assumed that some aspects of the decision-making of governments should 
remain closed to public scrutiny. This assumption establishes a continuous conflict between citizens 
and the state and within the state itself (represented by the elected officials and the bureaucracy) what 
to disclose and what not to; in other words, between openness and secrecy. It becomes therefore a 
struggle for government and the bureaucracy to find the middle ground between “open access to 
information [as] a default position unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary” (Office of the 
Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC), 2011) and Weber’s pronouncement that “every 
bureaucracy seeks to increase the superiority of the professionally informed by keeping their 
knowledge and intentions secret” (2009 (1946), p. 233). 
Citizens have also become increasingly aware of the implications of governments collecting data 
about them as individuals. They have sought the right to access this information and to ensure its 
accuracy, through FOI as well as through other channels. They have also sought to ensure that 
information about them is not disseminated to agencies and individuals who have no right to it—in 
other words, a concern for the privacy of personal details has arisen and is now the topic of reform to 
the Privacy Act 1988. 
Freedom of Information (FOI) legislation is one mechanism by which governments acknowledge that 
in principle, access to the public record is not only reasonable, but is conducive to accountability, 
good policy decisions and economic development. As Patricia Wald, US judge and founding chair of 




the interests of those who exercise power and the interests of the citizens at large is far from perfect, 
politics cannot be left solely to the politicians” (1984, p. 654). She might have added that providing 
access to the decision-making of governments should not be left to bureaucrats either. 
This study is concerned with the waxing and waning of government attitudes to openness by the 
politicians who in a democracy are the legitimate authority for setting the rules in the game of secrecy 
vs openness in Australia; and with the ways in which the bureaucrats, on behalf of the state interpret 
and implement these rules. It provides an overview of the outcome of FOI requests over the previous 
thirty-five years and reports on two case studies which explore two instances of requests for 
information under the FOI regime in Australia and the outcomes of those requests. The premise of the 
requests is that the information concerned is part of the Australian Commonwealth Government’s 
public record which is not classified and is not currently available, but access to which may be 
granted through Freedom of Information (FOI) legislation. This study has used data sets made 
available under the 2010 FOI reforms and the FOI annual reports. The data include numbers of 
requests and their outcomes: granted, partially granted, refused, reasons for refusal (exemptions), 
appeals and requests; and since 2011, individual agency data. 
Freedom of Information in Australia 
While freedom of information had its early roots in the right to information movements harking back 
to the Enlightenment, it is generally acknowledged that the Swedish Freedom of the Press Act of 
1766, offering “improved knowledge and appreciation of a wisely ordered system of government” 
(Mustonen, 2006, p. 8), is the world’s first Freedom of Information Act. In contemporary times, the 
first FOI legislation was introduced by the United States (1966). In Australia throughout the 1960s, 
right to know campaigns and discussions around government secrecy had proliferated (Australian 
Law Reform Commission (ALRC), 1995). It was, in part, the tragedy of the war in Vietnam and the 
secrecy around its decision-making processes and prosecution that led Gough Whitlam, a former 
Australian prime minister, to declare “the Australian Labor Party will build into the administration of 
the affairs of this nation machinery that will prevent any government, Labor or Liberal, from ever 
again cloaking your affairs under excessive and needless secrecy [my emphasis]” (Whitlam, 1972). 
In 1978 a Bill was introduced and finally passed as an Act in April 1982, making Australia the second 
country in the world to enact Freedom of Information Legislation. 
In the first three years of FOI in Australia, Hazell and Worthy noted that Australia’s performance 
“despite high levels of use and disclosure, suffer[s] from a high level of appeals, a lack of political 
support and consequent restrictive reform” (2010, p. 358). By 1995 it became apparent that the initial 
optimism and strong support for FOI had faded to neglect due to factors such as substantial 
amendments, increase of application fees and politically damaging requests (Terrill, 1998). In 
subsequent years, different governments initiated inquiries by the Australian Law Reform 
Commission (ALRC) to examine the 1982 Act. The purpose and titles of these inquiries are indicative 
of the conflict between openness and secrecy—“. . . to improve the quality of decision making by 
government agencies in both policy-and administrative matters by removing unnecessary secrecy 
surrounding the decision-making process” (ALRC1995, p. v), Keeping Secrets: The Protection Of 
Classified And Sensitive Information (2004); and Secrecy Laws And Open Government (2009). Each 
bears evidence that every change has an impact, since all considerations surrounding the 1978 Bill, 
“fail[ed] to engage with the extent passage of the FOI Act might itself encourage further change and 
the implications that may have” (Stewart, 2015, p. 104). 
The most far-reaching changes, recommended by the 2009 inquiry, were incorporated into the 
Freedom of Information Amendment (Reform) Act 2010, and included: 
 removal of FOI application and internal review fees; 
 removal of ministerial conclusive certificates (vetos or blanket exemptions), and replaced by 
two categories of exemptions to disclosure, 1) unconditional exemptions for sensitive 




 the concomitant Australian Information Commissioner Act 2010, creating the Office of the 
Information Commissioner (OAIC) with responsibility for the implementation of the new FOI 
framework. 
These reforms, particularly concerning conditional exemptions and the establishment of the OAIC, 
are the basis of the individual case studies testing the reality of the government’s commitment to 
openness. But first the paper examines the general pattern of trends that clearly shows the impact and 
implications of government policy changes. 
General trends 
An analysis of the trends in number of requests, and the approvals in full or in part and refusals gives 
an impression of the policies and concerns that have influenced the FIO regime. In the early years of 
FOI legislation, after a slow start in November 1982, there was a rapid rise in the number of requests 
until 1985-1986 (a total of 94,271 for the four years), at which point there was a steep decline to one 
of the lowest numbers overall—23, 543 in 1989-1990, second only to the historical low of 21,587 in 
2009-2010 (Figure 1). In part, this fall can be attributed directly to the introduction of fees for 
applications and processing charges “on the basis that users of the legislation should be required, 
where appropriate, to contribute towards meeting its cost” (Attorney General's Department, 1987, p. 
72). The decision to introduce FOI fees appears to have had a similar effect in other countries, for 
example, in Ireland after their introduction in 2003, the numbers of requests fell overall by 50% and 
by 75% for non-personal information (Information Commissioner of Ireland, 2004, p. 1). In 1991 a 
cap was put on the fee for personal information requests, possibly accounting for the steady rise of 
requests until 1996. And finally a steady rise is seen again from 2010 when all fees were removed for 
application requests, for internal reviews, and requests to amend or annotate personal records; 
processing charges for personal information were removed and for all other requests, the first five 
hours incurred no charge (Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC), 2012). 
 
Figure 1 Factors affecting general patterns of all FOI requests 1982-2015 
Data source: FOI requests, costs and charges, 1982-2015 
However, the fees and charges argument cannot explain the dramatic decrease in the use of FOI from 
2005-2006 until the 2010 reforms. A probable reason is that greater access to information, particularly 
personal information was becoming available through other means as a result of eGovernment 
policies. For example, in 2007-2008 the Department of Immigration and Citizenship registered a 47% 
drop in requests, Centrelink, 18% and Department of Veterans Affairs, 9% (a combined total decrease 
of 9,889 requests) as information could be requested and received through online and other informal 
channels (Attorney General's Department, 2008). Thus, it can be seen that interpretation of the data 
needs a cautious approach. The number of requests appears to rise when fees are lowered and to fall 
with other avenues of access to information, especially personal information. 




When early advocates for freedom of information legislation spoke of the removal of excessive 
secrecy, it is assumed that, in general, they were referring to access to policy-related documents and 
decisions. However, FOI requests also included requests for access to personal information and data 
collection did not separate policy-related information requests from requests for personal information 
until 2000. Figure 2 compares the number of requests for policy-related information with requests for 
personal information. Although the number of requests for personal information is far greater than 
those for policy-related information, the focus in this section is on policy-related requests made 
between 2000 and 2015. 
 
Figure 2 Comparison of numbers of personal and policy-related FOI requests 2000-2015 
Data source: FOI requests, costs and charges, 1982-2015 
Trends of policy-related requests, while similar in the period after 2005 (with the exception of 2008-
2009 already noted) are quite different. The period from 2000 to 2005 shows the number of requests 
to be relatively stable, in the range of 3361-3766; the more obvious dissimilarity is between the 
personal and policy-related requests (Figure 3). While both show steady increases in the period 2009-
2014, and taking into consideration, as noted above, the availability of access through other means, 
the increase in policy-related requests (109%) far outstripped the increase for personal information 
(21%). Finally in the last year policy requests decrease while personal requests continue to rise. 
Year Personal % Increase Policy-related % Increase 
2009-2010 18,823 – 2,764 – 
2013-2014 22,690 21% 5,773 109% 
2014-2015 30,297 34% 5,253 -9% 
 
Table 1 Comparative increases in personal and policy-related requests 2009-2014 
Data source: FOI requests, costs and charges, 1982-2015 
This dramatic increase in requests for policy-related information, coinciding as it does with FOI 
reforms that ended ministerial conclusive certificates (by which a minister was empowered to 
establish a document was exempt from disclosure), possibly reflects a public perception that the 
reforms would result in greater government openness. But it may also have been event-driven since 
this is the time when the number asylum seekers arriving by boat began to rise. An examination of 
requests made to individual agencies during this period (2011-2015) shows that the Immigration 






Agency No. of requests 
Immigration portfolio 2,435 
Australian Taxation Office 2,019 
Health portfolio 1,217 
Trade Marks Office 1,137 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission 823 
Department of Defence 813 
Attorney-General's Department 708 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 682 
Department of the Treasury 657 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 555 
 
Table 2 Top 10 agencies by number of policy-related requests 2011-2015 
Data source: FOI Annual Returns 2000-2015 
The question needs to be asked: are some requests treated more openly than others? or to put it 
another way, what are the reasons that some information is more likely to not to be provided?  And 
are there power factors entrenched in this judgements and outcomes?  If the intent of reforms of 2019-
2010 was to emphasise “proactive publication of government information and openness as the 
default” McMillan and Popple (2012, p. 1), then the emphasis is on access to policy-related 
information. But over the entire period that statistics have differentiated personal from policy-related 
requests, an average of 72% of personal requests has been granted in full, in comparison to 41% of 
policy-related requests (Table 3), making it difficult to dispute the argument that “most governments 
like to be judged on how much personal information they released under their FOI regimes” (Rick 
Snell, interviewed by Merritt, 2007). 
Decision Personal Policy-related 
Granted in full 72% 41% 
Partially granted 22% 40% 
Refused 6% 19% 
 
Table 3 Average outcomes for personal and policy-related requests 2000-2015 
Data source: FOI Annual Returns 2000-2015 
Since the 2010 reforms it is apparent the situation has not changed. While there is an overall decline 
in requests that are fully granted, personal information is released on average more than twice as often 
as policy information (63% to 28%), and the steep rise in refusals of policy requests is three times the 







Figure 3: Comparative outcome for personal and policy-related requests 2000-2015 
Data source: FOI Annual Returns 2000-2015 
On the other hand, since the reforms, data for partially-granted requests appears to contradict the 
evidence of secrecy, particularly for policy documents, which on average is significantly higher (43%) 
than for personal documents (29%), see Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: Percentage of total number of requests that have been partially granted 2000-2015 
Data source: FOI Annual Returns 2000-2015 
However, what is not obvious from this data is the percentage of content released, since disclosure is 
subject to conditional exemptions and determined by the public interest test. 
Exploring exemptions and the public interest 
FOI legislation has always set out types of information which are exempt from disclosure. From 1982 
to 2010, government ministers could also exercise a veto (conclusive certificates) over the disclosure 
of information. In the first years of FOI in Australia, Hazell and Worthy noted that Australia’s 
performance ‘despite high levels of use and disclosure, suffer[s] from a high level of appeals [against 
non-disclosure], a lack of political support and consequent restrictive reform’ (2010, p. 358). It has 
been speculated that this high number of appeals was a result of a heavy use of the veto that could be 
could be exercised by a single minister (ibid.). While successive reforms attempted to dilute 
ministerial and bureaucratic power to enforce secrecy conclusive certificates and exemptions, it was 
the 2010 reforms that introduced an additional category of conditional exemptions, conditional on a 





Unconditionally exempt Conditionally exempt 
 s 33 affecting national security, defence or 
international relations 
 s 47B Commonwealth-State relations 
 s 34 cabinet documents  s 47C deliberative processes 
 s 37 affecting enforcement of law and protection 
of public safety 
 s 47D financial or property interests of the 
Commonwealth 
 s 38 secrecy provisions  s 47E certain operations of agencies 
 s 42 subject to legal professional privilege  s 47F personal privacy 
 s 45 containing material obtained in confidence  s 47G business (to which s 47 applies) 
 s 45A Parliamentary Budgetary Office documents  s 47H research 
 s 46 which would be contempt of Parliament or 
court 
 s 47J the economy 
 s 47 disclosing trade secrets or commercially 
valuable information 
 
 s 47A electoral rolls and related documents  
 
Table 4 Types of documents that constitute exemptions under the FOI (Reform) Act 2010 
The concept of the public interest is fuzzy, and its meaning has changed across time, political regimes 
and democratic contexts (Box, 2007). It is not defined in either the original Act or in the current one, 
but is left “necessarily broad and nonspecific because what constitutes the public interest depends on 
the particular facts of the matter and the context in which it is being considered” (OAIC, 2014, p. 3), 
Thus the lack of transparency about how this test remains and there is still the possibility of a bias 
toward secrecy. Of the ten highest categories of all exemptions in the past five years, the top four 
(personal privacy, certain operations of agencies, business and deliberative processes) were 
conditionally exempt and therefore required to be subjected to a single public interest test (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5 The top ten categories of exemptions for policy-related documents 2011-2015 
Data source: FOI Annual Returns 2000-2015 
With regards to the public interest test, the Australian Law Reform Commission concluded that it is 
“an amorphous concept [and its determination] is essentially non-justiciable and depends on the 
application of a subjective rather than an ascertainable criterion” (1995, para 8.13). OAIC issued 
guidelines to help bureaucrats in the assessment of non-disclosure in the public interest: 
To conclude that, on balance, disclosure of a document would be contrary to the public interest 
is to conclude that the benefit to the public resulting from disclosure is outweighed by the benefit 
to the public of withholding the information. The decision maker must analyse, in each case, 
whereon balance the public interest lies, based on the particular facts of the matter at the time 





the inclusion of the exemptions and conditional exemptions in the FOI Act recognises that harm 
may result from the disclosure of some types of documents in certain circumstances; for example, 
where disclosure could prejudice an investigation, unreasonably affect a person’s privacy or 
reveal commercially sensitive information (ibid., para 6.26). 
The case studies 
The following case studies have been chosen to focus on some ways in which the public interest test 
has been used to refuse or only partially grant a request. They show the conflicts among different 
groups: the lawmakers and their intent; the bureaucrats who handle the requests and those making the 
requests.   
Each case is a request for documents that are conditionally exempt and is therefore couched in the 
framework that disclosure is in the public interest. The first revolves around the request for documents 
showing the processes of deliberation concerning a new policy decision (the conditional exemption of 
deliberative processes was used on an average of 267 times a year since 2010). The second examines 
the conflict between a government agency and the media and the mostly heavily used conditional 
exemption, personal privacy. 
A failure of the public interest test 
In the 2014-2015 budget the Commonwealth Government, citing the benefit of saving $10.2 million 
over four years, announced that from 1 January 2015 the OAIC’s status as a Financial Management 
and Accountability Act 1997 agency would cease and funding for ongoing functions would be 
transferred to other agencies, and that new arrangements for privacy and FOI regulation would 
commence from that date (Australian Government, 2014). In October 2014, it introduced a bill to 
repeal the Australian Information Commissioner Act 2010, including the abolition of OAIC, moving 
all FOI responsibilities to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and to the Attorney General. When the 
Bill had not passed the Senate by the end of 2014, in January 2015 an FOI request was made to OAIC 
[for] documents concerning discussions with the Attorney General's Department about the 
conduct of OAIC functions from 1 January 2015 including proposals put to or received from the 
Department concerning funding and staffing, and any agreement or understanding reached on 
these and related matter. . . The office is a key element in the Freedom of Information framework 
and in the exercise of citizen rights conferred by the act. The OAIC describes the information 
commissioner functions as "designed to ensure maximum coordination, efficiency and 
transparency in government information policy and practice”. Disclosure of documents 
concerning discussion about the conduct of these functions would advance public debate on this 
topic of current importance (Timmins, 2015) 
In March 2015, the FOI officer determined that sixty-four documents were relevant; these were emails 
between OAIC and the departments of the Attorney-General, the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the 
Australian Human Rights Commission. None was granted in full. Twenty were redacted as irrelevant 
material, under s 22(1). The other forty-four emails were considered subject to the deliberative 
processes exemption s 47C; of these, thirteen were refused outright and thirty-one were heavily 
redacted. Under the public interest test, the factors cited were  
the Bill has not passed through parliament [and] disclosure of the documents could reasonably 
be expected to impact on the ability of the OAIC to obtain full opinions and recommendations 
from relevant agencies [which] factors against disclosure are significant and at this point in time 
and outweighs [sic] the factors in favour of disclosure (ibid.) 
This decision apparently equated the fact that the Bill has not yet passed to the guideline where 
disclosure could prejudice an investigation. This decision on non-disclosure contradicts the 
government’s default position of openness, and as argued by Paterson negates the public’s need for 
access “in order to be able to participate meaningfully in, or to be able to understand and evaluate the 




the government agency that by legislation is responsible for freedom of information would seem to be 
very much in the public interest. But an examination of the documents redacted under the conditional 
exemption of deliberative processes, shows that this was not the judgement of the FOI officer. In fact, 
the information provided is unlikely to advance transparency and openness in this matter since, with 
the exceptions of communication pleasantries and the email trails, all relevant content is drowned in 
black (Figure 7). 
 
Figure 6 Examples of FOI requests redacted under conditional exemption 47C 
Data source: Right to Know 
At the time, given the concerns of the government, one might have speculated that the emails would 
disclose an overriding preference for saving money by rescinding legislation and transferring ultimate 
responsibility to the Attorney General for the administration of the freedom of information, instead of 
encouraging openness of government. 
There is a post script note to this case study—when the Senate adjourned the second reading in 
October 2014, it referred the matter to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation 
Committee. This bill was one of those that lapsed due to prorogation of first session of 44th 
Parliament 17/4/16. One might speculate that the Senate was of the opinion that any attempt to abolish 
the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner failed the public interest test. Under the new 
Prime Minister, OAIC was re-funded. 
Journalism and the perception of secrecy 
In democratic societies there is little doubt of the importance of journalism in holding governments 
accountable; journalistic endeavours culminating in Harold Cross’s 1953 book The People’s Right to 
Know is considered to be the language of the first modern FOI legislation, the US Freedom of 
Information Act 1966. However, in the early FOI regimes of Australia, and New Zealand, there 
appeared to be little interest by journalists in using the Act to obtain documents concerning 
government actions (Attorney General's Department, 1988; Morrison, 1997). Twenty years later, 
Stephen Lamble commented that the “Australian media generally seems to have given up the fight in 
relation to FoI” (2004, p. 8) and studies of journalists’ use of FOI conclude that there is heavy 
redaction to the point of uselessness (Bluemink & Brush, 2005; Cuillier, 2011), a state of affairs that 
re-enforces a perception of secrecy by the government and the worthlessness of the FOI mechanism in 
supporting transparency. 
This case is concerned with information related to the management of the asylum-seeking process. 
Over the past fifteen years the Department of Immigration has been criticised for its secrecy over 
asylum seekers who have arrived by boat, and their detention and treatment in offshore facilities on 
Nauru and Manus Island; a simple search on Factiva for Australian newspaper coverage since 2011 
yielded over 325 newspaper articles that used phrases such as the secrecy surrounding its maritime 
operations, inordinate and unacceptable secrecy and shrouded by a veil of secrecy. Even the Select 
Committee on the Recent Allegations Relating to Conditions and Circumstances at the Regional 
Processing Centre in Nauru, commenting on the department’s contractual arrangements, concluded 




relation to the Nauru RPC, it believes that a far greater level of scrutiny, transparency and 
accountability is required” (2015, p. 124). However the department’s FOI annual returns present a 
different picture, giving a very positive view of openness. In the years 2011-2015 only 395 of all 
policy-related requests (1,995) were refused, an average of 20%. Again, an analysis of requests 
granted either in full or partially is a better measure for openness than the number refused. 
There are two constraints affecting this case. The data available for this case are not consistent during 
the period 2011-2015 and the disclosure logs do not identify requests made by the media. The logs for 
2011-2013 give only the disclosure date and a description of the documents requested with no 
indication of the outcome. Nevertheless, the 2014 and 2015 show a total of 186 items of which 58 
were granted in full and 128 partially granted. Of these, sixteen requests contained the words Nauru 
and/or Manus in the description. Six requests were granted in full, none concerning the treatment of 
asylum seekers, and the other ten were mostly redacted under the personal privacy conditional 
exemption s 47(F), confirming, as would be expected, the dominant use of this category within the 
department (Figure 7). Not coincidently the steep increase in the number of refusals for access after 
2011-2012 corresponds with the post-2010 election campaigns when the issue of asylum seekers and 
the management of the process had been a key campaigning matter. 
 
Figure 7 Top 4 exemption categories used across Immigration portfolio 2011-2015 
Data sources: FOI Annual Returns 2000-2015 
The second part of this case provides an illustration of what Morrison (1997) calls bureaucratic game-
playing strategies to circumvent disclosure to journalists; not only does it confirm public perception of 
secrecy, but demonstrates journalists’ retaliatory strategies. 
In the mid-2013 a group of independent journalists used Right to Know, a freedom of information 
project of Open Australia Foundation, to lodge 121 separate requests for offshore detention incident 
reports. All were refused. The grounds for refusal were a “practical refusal” under s 24(2). Under this 
mechanism, all requests could be treated as one since they “relate to documents, the subject matter of 
which is substantially the same”. One journalist, Paul Farrell, was also advised that the request met a 
second practical refusal reason under s 24AA: since all requests were to be treated as one, it was 
estimated to take 255 hours to process, a figure far above the regulatory cap of forty hours (Farrell, 
2013). Then in February 2016 another request was lodged for documents concerning “specific 
medical services” incidents, a request that was partially granted (Cooney, 2016). The FOI officer’s 
decision, communicated as follows: “I have interpreted the scope of your request to exclude personal 
identifiers (such as names), and as such, IHMS [company responsible for medical services] did not 
provide this information” was to release four documents (126 pages) of the IHMS complaints register. 
Indeed the register has no personal identifiers, but nevertheless every page has the same two columns 
redacted—the description of the complaint, and the subsequent comments, rendering the documents 
useless to the requestor. 
By contrast, in mid-2016 Paul Farrell, now with the Guardian newspaper, received 2,000 un-redacted 
leaked incident reports of over 8,000 pages—known as the Nauru Papers—which set out “the 




seekers held by the Australian government, painting a picture of routine dysfunction and cruelty” 
(Farrell, Evershed, & Davidson, 2016). In order to responsibly protect the personal privacy of the 
detainees—adopting the FOI conditional exemption s47F(1)— The Guardian’s journalists removed 
the names of all asylum seekers and staff; personal identification numbers of asylum seekers (their 
six-digit “boat arrival numbers”); ages of the asylum seekers named in reports; signatures of detention 
staff; nationalities with small population groups; residential tent numbers; and in some cases further 
identifying information (Farrell & Evershed, 2016). Figure 8 contrasts one of these leaked documents 
document, redacted equivalently to comply with s 47F(1) and its probable listing in the complaints 
register of IHMS. 
 
Figure 8 Comparison of FOI document and redacted content in leaked document 
(Sources: Right to Know; The Guardian) 
While the publication of the heavily redacted documents might raise further questions concerning 
privacy and the public interest, it is hard to argue with Ester’s comment that “one consequence of 
ineffective or non-existent Freedom of Information (FoI) laws is to force political journalists to 
depend on oral and/or "brown envelope" leaks” (2006, p. 162). 
Discussion 
These two case studies demonstrate the inherent tensions and inevitability of conflicts and power 
struggles in the concept, perhaps ideal, of open government, which favours transparency and a well-
informed citizenry. On the continuum from secrecy to openness there are many intersecting points: 
good governance, accountability, transparency, privacy, confidentiality, national interest, public 
interest, and self-interest, all of which collide in the mechanism of exemptions to freedom of 
information. The number of reviews undertaken since the legislation was introduced is evidence of the 
tensions inherent in the FOI mechanisms. The major recommendation of the recent Hawke review 
was “that a comprehensive review of the FOI Act be undertaken (Hawke, 2013, p. 4), particularly 
singling out the question of exemptions which are 
a feature of all FOI legislation, recognising that the right of access provided by the legislation is 
not absolute. The purpose of exemptions is to balance the objective of providing access to 
government information against legitimate claims for the protection of sensitive material. The 
exemptions provide the confidentiality necessary for the proper workings of government and 
protection of the confidences and privacy of those who have dealings with government or about 
whom information is collected by government (ibid., p. 39) 
This study has shown that the application of the conditional exemptions is subject to arbitrary 
decision-making or different interpretations of the rules, notwithstanding the mechanism of internal 
review, introduced by the 2010 reforms, designed to lessen this; in the last four years, 2011-2015, an 















2011-2012 273 18 53 11 30% 
2012-2013 262 16 65 4 33% 
2013-2014 284 10 47 2 21% 
2014-2015 221 12 35 4 23% 
 
Table 5 Applications and outcomes for internal reviews of policy-related requests 
Data source: FOI Annual Returns 2011-2015 
This proportion shows that the concept of the public interest is open to interpretation and there is 
always room for a cynical assessment that a particular interpretation is intended to over-ride any 
possibilities of transparency and to prevent the flow of information as intended in the idealist concept 
of Freedom of Information as comments on two exemptions will demonstrate. 
The use of s24, the ‘practical refusal’ mechanism, is one of the conditional exemptions that appears to 
be used to place the interests of bureaucrats over those of the informed citizenry. That the nature of 
fees for FOI is contentious has already been mentioned. OAIC concedes that agencies and ministers 
have the option to impose “access charges [as] a way of controlling and managing demand for 
documents . . . [and for] defraying some of the cost of FOI to government”(2012, p. 1). Indeed the 
OAIC review into fees highlighted the “difficulties agencies face in using s 24AB of the FOI Act (the 
‘practical refusal’ mechanism)” to achieve a balance of these competing interests (ibid., p. 4). 
Between 2011 and 2015 the number of practical refusals by the Immigration Department increased by 
over 560% and of those, in 2014-2015 only 8% were subsequently processed, in contrast to 26% 
across all agencies. 
Year Notification of refusal Subsequently processed 
 All agencies Immigration 
portfolio 
All agencies Immigration 
portfolio 
2011-2012 193 35 54 (28%) 0 (0%) * 
2012-2013 466 40 206 (44%) 49 (100%) 
2013-2014 714 150 182 (25%) 15 (10%) 
2014-2015 896 233 230 (26%) 19 (8%) 
 
Table 6 Practical refusals for policy-related requests 
(*presumably nine requests had been held over from the previous year) 
Data source: FOI Annual Returns 2011-2015 
Based on these data the practical refusal mechanism appears to be a very successful strategy for 
preventing the flow of information to requestors, and thus preserving notions of secrecy rather than 
supporting openness. 
The protection of personal data is fundamental in liberal western democracies to prevent abuse of 
individual privacy by state powers, organisations and individuals. If one of the aims of freedom of 
information is to enable transparency, then it must be balanced against the right to privacy; 
transparency, it is suggested by Richard Oliver is “flash point at the intersection of the public's right to 
know and the individual's or organization's right to privacy” (2004, p. x). While the 2010 replacement 
of conclusive certificates with conditional exemptions dependent on a single public interest test 
advances the balance between secrecy and openness, this is an imperfect solution to power conflicts 
about the release of policy-related information. 
The cynicism that governments actively work to prevent the more liberal aspects of Freedom of 




mechanisms prevent the disclosure of information. The following statement by an Attorney General, 
when in opposition, is revealing 
the true measure of the openness and transparency of a government is found in its attitudes and 
actions when it comes to freedom of information. Legislative amendments, when there is need for 
them, are fine, but governments with their control over the information in their possession can 
always find ways to work the legislation to slow or control disclosure (Brandis in Senate Debates 
Australia, Senate, 2009, p. 4849). 
Conclusion 
This paper concludes that in Australia the FOI regime has not evenly achieved a balance between 
openness and secrecy. Patterns of FOI requests show successive governments’ enthusiasm for 
releasing/amending personal information, which does little to advance the flow of information about 
government decision-making processes and the associated accountability and transparency in 
government. In contrast, disclosure of policy-related materials, arguably the central purpose of FOI, 
appears less zealous, suggesting a “distaste for openness is part of a larger concern about the 
proliferation of constraints on executive authority (Roberts, 2006, p. 19). There have been several 
attempts to resolve the tensions through reforms to the Act by counterbalancing constraints with 
exemptions, without which Falconer, the advocate for the UK FOI legislation, suggests “good 
government would be impossible” (2004). However there is strong evidence of the power of 
politicians and bureaucrats in the workings of the FOI regime. The situation in Australia could be 
summarised as follows: “it is easier for governments to demonstrate adherence to openness principles 
by maintaining FOI laws and then to loosen the constraints imposed by those laws through less visible 
administrative actions” (Roberts, 2006, p. 317). 
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